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Abstract. The research concerns self-monitoring psychological 
processes and aims to verify two hypothesises: that there is difference in 
the theories on Self in HSM and LSM, and that the HSMs are more able 
implicit readers than the LSMs. The 18 item SMS was administered to 
86 people, who had also undergone the implicit reading test. HSM and 
LSM were then thoroughly studied with further implicit reading trials 
and by means of dilemmas intended to explore their implicit theories of 
self. The HSMs read more implicits, in a livelier way, and with less 
fatigue. The dilemmas show differences in the structure of the self and 
above all in the moral conviction of self. 
Keywords: Self-monitoring, implicit messages, implicit theory of self, moral of self, 
perception of situation, self-expression, self-presentation. 
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1. Introduction 
Since Snyder’s proposal (1974) of the self-monitoring construct and of a scale to 
measure the differences among individuals in this sector, many research studies have 
been published on this subject. Some of them have been useful in order to clarify the 
meaning and value of the differences of individuals, revealing other correlated 
differences (regarding friendship relationships, sensitivity to advertisements, flexibility 
in leadership styles). Moreover, they contributed to explain differences and to trace 
what happens in the mind of individuals any time they are faced with the problem of 
regulating the behaviours linked to their selves in the different situations of their social 
lives. Self- monitoring psychological processes appears to be a stimulating field of 
investigation, leading to an intense and fruitful exchange of ideas and results. The 
following study is based on the idea that self-monitoring differences in individuals and 
the underlying psychological processes may be better understood by investigating social 
cognition styles, communication understanding and common beliefs on the self, in 
particular moral views. 
 
2. Suppositions and research matters 
2.1 Assumptions regarding the implicit theories of self  
By means of what mental processes do individuals choose their self-monitoring 
behaviours? Snyderís convincing analysis (1979) reveals that individuals in their social 
experiences ask themselves how to match their behaviours linked to the self with the 
situation they are experiencing, though expressing the question in different ways. The 
high self-monitoring individuals (HSM) ask themselves “who does this situation want 
me to be and how can I be that person?”, whereas low self-monitoring individuals” 
(LSM) question is “Who am I and how can be me in this situation?”. Hence two 
different strategies: self- presentation (imagining and acting the part of a suitable self) 
on the one hand and self- expression (letting a suitable behaviour out of the self one 
believes to have) on the other. 
However, why are there individuals asking themselves the first question and others 
choosing the second one? This appears to be crucial in order to understand self-
monitoring individual differences. It may be inferred that the kind of question depends   3
on the aim to adopt the consequent strategy. However, it seems certain that the urge for 
self-presentation (i.e. the need to positively exert an influence on other people, in order 
to obtain approval or to avoid disapproval (Arkin, 1981) as well as the need to reinforce 
self-esteem (Leary & Kowalski, 1990)), and the desire to find confirmation of the self 
one believes to have urging for self-expression (Snyder & Gangestad 1982; Swan & 
Hill, 1982; Swan & Ely, 1984; Swan, 1985, 1987,1992) are very strong. Therefore, 
there must be something that breaks the balance of motivations.  
It appears reasonable to suppose that there is a cognitive element, a piece of knowledge 
urging to ask either the first question or the second one.  Self-conception certainly plays 
a very important role. As anticipated by their behaviours and as shown by research 
studies on the matter (Snyder, 1976, 1979; Sampson, 1978), HSM individuals have a 
more flexible self-conception, which is more linked to situations and social 
involvement, whereas the self-conception of LSM individuals appears more rigid, less 
dependent on social context but linked to principles and mental dispositions. This is the 
reason why HSM individuals prefer self-presentation, while LSM individuals feel at 
ease with self- expression. 
However, there is a second hypothesis. Everyone has got a certain knowledge of 
themselves and a certain number of ideas on the self in general, as an object in the 
world. Though being an ignorant philosopher and psychologist, each individual works 
out an implicit theory of  self, answering in a more or less precise way to the following 
questions: What is self?, how is it made? what is it made of? etc. Implicit theories of 
self may be crucial in breaking the balance of motivations and urging individuals either 
for the first or the second question. For example, LSM individuals may think that self is 
indivisible; therefore, if in one situation they present themselves in a different way from 
usual, they believe they alter their selves. Conversely, HSM individuals could think that 
self is divisible and if they present a different self on one occasion they believe they 
always have another self, in the background, which is always coherent with what they 
are. Moreover, LSM individuals might consider morally blameworthy the presentation 
of a self other than the one they think to have, while HSM individuals may find it licit. 
2.2 Hypothesis concerning the contingent perception of situations   4
Since it was first expressed, the self-monitoring concept has always implied a difference 
in signals perception providing information about the right thing to do in a certain 
situation (Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Monson, 1975). It is possible to extend this idea to 
the perception in self-monitoring: do individuals with different self-monitoring levels 
have different perceptions of the same situation? Can this explain behavioural 
differences? 
We may suppose that before asking the questions Snyder indicated in his study, all 
individuals, no matter what their self-monitoring levels are, ask themselves another 
question: “Shall I care in this situation to adopt an adequate social behaviour?”. In this 
case, there would be two different choices. First of all individuals choose whether and 
to which extent in that situation it is worth caring for behaviour control. Secondly, they 
decide how to rule their behaviours, i.e. whether they should adopt a self-presentation or 
a self-expression strategy. 
Also the first choice may exert an influence on the self-monitoring differences. 
Individuals evaluate the situation they are living in relation to their objectives and 
decide whether it is worth caring for a careful control of behaviour. In case of a 
situation with peculiar characteristics (i.e., a meaningful, unusual, ambiguous situation) 
individuals go straight to the second stage and make a strategic choice. It is possible to 
think that self-monitoring differences are partly due to a different evaluation of social 
life situations. LSM individuals could have a more selective filter (i.e., they believe that 
very few situations are worth caring for a behaviour control) than HSM ones (in a large 
number of situations behaviour shall be controlled). Ostensibly, LSM individuals may 
maintain constant selves in various social situations just because they do not believe that 
in those situations there is a need for a higher control of their social behaviours. 
What makes the filter more or less selective? Seemingly, it may be a different degree of 
importance attached to the objectives, as well as a different perception of situation. The 
second hypothesis appears more interesting. Indeed, social life situations may be 
perceived as more necessary or more contingent. The more they are taken for granted, 
since they come from pre-existing social rules and frames, the more we find them 
necessary. The more we perceive them as “open”, since they are defined on the spot by 
means of interaction and communication, the more they appear contingent. This means,   5
for example, that students may consider a conversation with a teacher nothing more than 
an examination with its established rules or, on the other hand, they may believe that it 
is a situation they may control, with mostly unpredictable developments. In the first 
case cultural and social conditioning is stressed, while in the second emphasis is placed 
on the possibility for an interaction of developing autonomously, thus creating social 
and cultural events. 
Situations easily appear peculiar, important and worth of a careful control of behaviour 
to those who have a contingent perception. It is impossible to define from the beginning 
whether a situation is relevant to one is own ends, therefore it is necessary to follow 
carefully its developments. Conversely, if a situation is perceived as necessary, 
individuals tend to underestimate the possibility that it may become important. 
Therefore, many situations are not considered worth caring  for a careful control of 
behaviour. HSM individuals may tend to have a contingent perception, whereas LSM 
individuals appear to have a necessary perception. 
2.3 Hypothesis on the reading of implicit contents 
Implicit contents exert a decisive influence on contingent developments of a social 
situation, on the way it evolves during interaction and communication. Interlocutors 
negotiate, exert pressure or manipulate their relations mainly by means of implicit 
contents: this is their way of establishing exactly what kind of interaction or 
communication they want to create, what subject they prefer to deal with, what 
knowledge they consider as shared, etc. Everything appears important: presuppositions 
or semantic implicits, which are relatively independent from the context, pragmatic 
implcits which are strongly linked to context (Grice, 1975),  indirect linguistic acts 
(Searle, 1975), conversation implicits (Grice, 1975) and all other hidden messages   
given by those  communication activities which have been less investigated up to now, 
such as for example the athematic (Di Giovanni, 1983). 
There are many reasons why implicit messages appear more suitable than explicit ones 
in order to define a situation immediately. In case the intention of transmitting a certain 
content is hidden (as in the major part of pragmatic implicits), implicit meanings are a 
useful tool to exert pressure, since nobody may be considered responsible for something 
which has not been said. Therefore, we act in a smooth way, with no risk of reprimand,   6
and if everything is all right, it will appear that things have gone as they should do 
(Ducrot, 1972). Even when intention is stated openly (as normally happens in 
presuppositions), the implicit meaning is still protected by discussion: it is difficult that 
the partner in the conversation challenges it (Ducrot, 1972). Therefore, it is stronger and 
safer than the explicit meaning. Since the interlocutor can understand it only after an 
inferential activity, implicit meanings are an ideal tool to negotiate interaction and 
conversation developments: I can introduce an implicit meaning, wait and see whether 
my partner in the conversation notices it or not, without the risk of dangerous reactions. 
That’s how a good negotiator acts (Ghiglione, 1988). 
Given the role of implicits in interactions and in communication, it is possible that those 
who are urged for an immediate perception of the situation are also good readers of 
implicits. In order to understand a situation immediately one has to be trained in 
inferring meanings. After a long training one may become a good reader of implicits. 
Hence, it seems possible to assume that HSM individuals are better reader of implicits 
than LSM individuals. Moreover, there could even be differences in the way implicit 
contents are inferred. 
In order to understand an implicit content sometimes we simply use deductive 
reasoning: from one rule, normally regarding social life or communication, we deduce 
the content we believe valid in that specific case. More often we use abduction: we 
match a rule and a piece of information  taken from the context or from the ongoing 
communication and reach our conclusions. Let us take an example from a comic film. 
Householder: Where have you been? 
Housemaid: In Las Vegas. 
Householder: And my two dollars? 
Housemaid: I bet them on the 25, as you told me to do. 
The householder (wrongly) infers the implicit meaning that the housemaid has not won. 
He may have deduced it (it is very difficult to win betting only on one number/ she bet 
only on one number/ it is very difficult that she has won) or abducted it either from the 
context (normally if a person has won a lot of money, he/she is exultant/ she is not   7
exultant/she has not won) or from communication signals (if she had won, she would 
have not said  “as you told me to do”/ she said it/She has lost). 
It is interesting to observe that the reasoning may be based either on background 
elements, thus resulting more fixed and predictable, or on foreground elements and 
become more variable and contingent. Rules may be taken from a background 
knowledge (you cannot win betting only on one number) or from a foreground one (if 
she had won, she would have not said “as you told me to do”). Information used in 
abduction, on the other hand, may concern the context (she is not exultant) or 
foreground communication signals (she said “as you told me to do”). 
Those who tend to have a contingent perception of situations should tend to use 
foreground rules and information. This could be what leads them to consider situations 
contingent, thus creating a sort of loop of self-amplification. Therefore, the opposite 
should be true for those who tend to perceive necessary situations. Hence we come to 
another hypothesis: HSM individuals while reading implicit contents adopt procedures 
which imply mainly foreground information. 
2.5 Research Questions 
There are three questions: 1) Are there differences in the implicit theories of self   
between LSM and HSM individuals which may explain why they choose either self-
expression or self-presentation? 2) Are HSM individuals better than LSM ones at 
reading implicit contents? 3) Do HSM individuals read implicit contents by adopting 
inferential procedures which involve mainly foreground information? These are only 
preliminary questions, which do not answer the questions we posed previously, but just 
start the investigation of the matter. 
The question regarding the implicit theories of self is fairly generic. It is essential to 
specify the differences dealt with, which means that one must have an idea of the 
implicit theories of self and how to deal with them. It is possible to start from some 
questions concerning the self in philosophy and psychology. Such approach, however, 
wrongly presumes that common sense problems are similar to questions regarding 
critical thought, though offering a practical and clear pattern. This study, therefore, shall 
deal with the following question: as far as the above mentioned questions are 
concerned, what is the position of the individuals studied? We borrowed four questions   8
from the critical tradition: 1) Has self any substance or is it the synthesis of various 
experiences? Is it a person within a person or simply knowledge of self ? 2) is self rigid 
or fluid? Is it stable or does it change easily? 3) is it unique or multiple? Do we have 
only one self or many selves depending on life experiences and circumstances? 4) Has 
self private or social origins? Do we know ourselves examining our state of mind or 
through information we gather participating in social life? 
 
3. Our research study 
3.1 Investigated sample 
The Self-Monitoring Scale with 18 items (Snyder, 1986) has been applied to a sample 
made up of 86 persons (students of Communication Science at the University of 
Teramo, who had not followed psychology courses yet). The Italian version adopted is 
slightly different from others (Scilligo, 1990; Delle Grazie, 2003) and has been already 
used in studies similar to Snyder’s original one (1974). 
Having filled in a form, all students were tested on the reading of implicit meanings. 
They only had few context elements and had to find out the largest number possible of 
implicit contents in a sentence.  
A couple are going out. The husband asks his wife”Did you forget the light on?” – 
What does it mean? Express all implicit meanings that cross your head. 
3.2 Thorough comparison between LSM and HSM individuals 
Later the students with the lowest scores (7 individuals who scored less than 5) and 
those with the highest ones (11 persons who scored more than 13) in the Self- 
Monitoring Scale were asked to be thoroughly examined for almost one hour. 
Everybody was happy to co-operate, some of them were curious (researchers had told 
them that the study dealt with a personality aspect relevant to social relationships and 
had agreed an appointment in order to examine the results), others were motivated by 
the credits the test granted for the psychology course (and this appeared legitimate, 
since they were actively involved in a research study and analysed its results). 
Conversations were recorded. The interviewer had two assistants who did not take part 
in the conversation, but observed and took notice of the behaviours of interviewed   9
people and their interactions with the interviewer. The way individuals answered and 
participated in the conversation could give useful information, therefore it was 
necessary to check interference of the interviewer who could unintentionally suggest 
answers or  put the students on the wrong track, even though he did not know the score 
of the person under examination. 
In the first part of the conversation the examined individuals were asked again to read 
implicit contents. This time they were given “naked” statements, with no context 
elements and were to follow a different procedure. First of all they had to venture 
hypothesis on hidden meanings. Then, once they could not find any new meaning, they 
were required to ask questions in order to get useful information to verify their 
hypotheses. In the first part the test revealed the ability of the individuals to imagine 
hidden meanings. In the second part, examining the way they tried to explore the matter, 
it was possible to understand what they inferred and what knowledge they used. In case 
of doubt the interviewer could ask the examined person to explain his/her way of 
reasoning. Every student received four cards, each one with an explicit statement. Each 
card was handed out only after the conclusion of the previous task. 
1) A asks : “Would you like a coffee?” 
B answers “Coffee doesn’t make one sleep” 
2) A says: “John is a machine” 
3) A says: “Marc is on time” 
4) A says: “The cellar is flooded” 
The second part of the conversation was a thorough interview on implicit theory of self. 
One after the other four dilemmas were introduced. In each case the subject was asked 
to take position and encouraged to freely express opinions and ideas. 
The partner’s dilemma 
In order to make a love affair last, is it more important to choose carefully the partner, 
evaluating what kind of person he/she is, or try to create a harmonious and satisfactory 
relationship once you have chosen the partner? 
Anna’s dilemma   10
Anna works in the advertisement sector and is a creative person. She receives the offer 
to become account executive in the same agency. She would earn more, but she is 
confused: she wonders whether she is cut out for public relations. Her boss insists, 
being convinced that she could succeed. Anna is afraid of yielding to pressure and of  
regretting it in the future. Is it better for her to take a rest and try to solve her problem 
alone or to start a brief trial period in the new task? 
Luca’s dilemma 
Luca starts thinking about the fact that when he goes to work he attaches great 
importance to the way he dresses and to the care of his body, while when he is at home 
he is very shabby. What is your opinion about Luca? 
Antonio’s dilemma 
Antonio is a commercial traveller. He goes and sees one of his clients, to whom he 
wants to sell absolutely one of his products. The client has got racist ideas, while 
Antonio is firmly anti-racist. The client starts talking against Islamic and non-EU   
people. What shall Antonio do? 
As can be seen the above mentioned dilemmas are based on fundamental questions of 
self and give the possibility to understand what the individual under examination thinks 
about it. After the examination of the dilemmas, Anna’s dilemma (whether self may be 
understood in private or in the social life) is approached more directly: 
- Describe a characteristic of yours. 
- (answer) 
- How can you say that it is so? 
Then the interviewer asked the individual openly about the other questions posed by the 
dilemmas: 
- Who are we? What we do in our lives or something that is inside ourselves? 
- How can you best know yourself  by retiring to private life or staying with other 
people? 
- Are we always the same or do we change? 
- Is being true to oneself the most important thing, even though it costs you dear?   11
 
4. Results 
4.1 Self-monitoring and reading of implicit meanings 
The scores of the sample under examination appear similar to those usually obtained by 
means of the Self-Monitoring Scale: a Gaussian distribution with the largest number of 
individuals in the central part (Fig.1). 
   
Figure 1 
 
The performances during the test of reading of implicit contents were evaluated 
counting the number of new implicit meanings identified by each individual. In some 
cases there was the risk of mistakes due to the subjective judgement of those who 
processed data: indeed, it is not always easy to decide if two implicit meanings, 
expressed with different words, shall be considered identical or if there is a different 
shade of meaning implying another hidden meaning. Even though there were few 
doubts, in order to obtain the most objective evaluation, answers were examined by 
various independent evaluators, who did not know the Self- Monitoring Scale scores. 
As appears in the scatter diagram there is a certain correlation between the Self-
Monitoring Scale score and the number of implicit meanings found.  Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient is equal to .527. Comparing the performance of LSM 
and HSM individuals  a difference appears evident (Fig.2): the former are able to read 
an average of 0,6 implicit meanings (those found by this group ranged from 0 to 1),   12
whereas the latter are able to read an average of 3,2 (in the worst performances 2 
implicit meanings were found, in the best ones 8). At a thorough examination HSM 
individuals appeared better at doing this task. Indeed, while LSM individuals proposed 
just 1 or 2 implicit meanings, HSM individuals were able to find even 8-10 implicit 
contents. Moreover, they appeared to be extremely livelier reader of implicit meanings. 
They were able to make suppositions more rapidly and gave the impression they used 
less mental resources. Conversely, LSM individuals appeared totally absorbed by their 
task. HSM individuals, on the other hand, were able to evaluate themselves while 
making suppositions: they played the part of an ideal critical interlocutor, managing the 
relation with the interviewer and his assistants and processing their own self-
presentation. While the speeches of LSM individuals were full of hesitations and 
pauses, the HSM individuals’ ones were fluent and, in case of hesitations, these 









There was also a great difference as for imagination between the two groups. LSM 
individuals appeared subservient, i.e. they tended not to go far from the most obvious 
hypothesis. HSM individuals, on the other hand, made the most original, sometimes 
imaginative and  funny suppositions. They adopted the following strategy: they draw up 
scenarios and made up stories in which characters said the sentences they had been 
given. 
The comparison of the performances of the two groups highlighted also a different 
degree of curiosity and fun in carrying out the task. LSM individuals, once they had 
made one supposition, were satisfied with it and there was little likelihood that they 
would make a second one, unless they were strongly encouraged by the interviewer. 
Some of them clearly showed to be bored. HSM individuals, on the contrary, were not 
able to stop making suppositions and had troubles complying with the rules of the 
interview: they went on making supposition about the implicit meanings of one 
statement even when they were verifying the hypotheses already expressed, prolonging 
the interview, sometimes until the interviewer stopped them. 
In order to understand these differences let us compare the hypotheses about one 
sentence expressed by an individual who scored 17 and by a student whose SMS score 
was 4. 
A ask: “Would you like a coffee?”. B answers: “Coffee doesn’t make one sleep”. 
The individual who scored 17   14
“It depends. It isn’t necessarily so. Perhaps he/she could or could not want to have a 
coffee. I mean, it may be that B says that coffee does not make one sleep, but 
nevertheless he/she wants a coffee.[…]. Well, I don’t know… It could be a suggestion 
that B makes to A, maybe A takes too many cups of coffee, so B suggests A that coffee 
doesn’t make one sleep, or that it is late, therefore it is better for A to take no coffee 
[…]. There is also the possibility that B says “Coffee doesn’t make one sleep” because 
he/she wants to refuse the offer. Maybe he/she means “It’s no use trying to convince 
me: I will resist”. Hence the answer “Coffee doesn’t make one sleep”, in order to stress 
that… that there is no use, he/she will never accept [..] Perhaps B’s answer is due to the 
fact that the evening before he/she had had a coffee too late […] and therefore he/she 
did not sleep. So B means he/she does not want to make the same mistake. Maybe A has 
some economic difficulties […] therefore he/she cannot afford to offer repeatedly a 
coffee to B […] who says “coffee doesn’t make one sleep” in order to refuse A’s offer, 
fearing he/she would spend more than he/she can afford […] If they are in a café down 
town, where coffee is very expensive B says “coffee doesn’t make one sleep” meaning 
“do not waste so much money for a coffee in this café, let us go to another one”, he/ she 
means “let’s go somewhere else”, or “forget it”. If coffee is bad for B, he/she may say 
it to make a good impression with someone he/she knows, maybe A knows B well, they 
are relatives […]. Yes, maybe B likes coffee and drinks coffee even at night, but on that 
occasion, in order to make a good impression …. In order to prevent A from  thinking  
that B is causing harm to himself/herself, the latter says “Coffee doesn’t make one 
sleep” 
[The interviewer hands out another sentence] 
Individual with SMS score 4 
No, he/she wouldn’t 
[After 5 seconds of silence the interviewer asks “Are there any other hypotheses that 
come into your mind?”. Again, 13 seconds of silence, then the individual firmly 
answers: “No”]. 
It is interesting to point out that individuals performed better in the interviews than in 
the written task. This is more evident with HSM individuals: the number of implicit 
meanings found raised considerably and, in comparison with the interviews, there was   15
not the same lively imagination underlying the answers given in the written test. It 
seems that for HSM individuals the social task makes things easier. 
In the following part of the test regarding the reading of implicit contents, i.e. when 
students were encouraged to ask information in order to verify the suppositions made, 
further differences were highlighted. Individuals with low scores in the SMS were 
almost always concerned with the context (What is the job of the speaker? What is 
his/her personality like? Is the situation taking place at his/her workplace? etc.). Only 
rarely did they ask questions about communication signals (what is the expression on 
his/her face? Is he/she joking? Is he/she disdainful? etc.). Individuals with a high score 
were more balanced in making their questions both about context and communication. 
While investigating about the context, they asked questions involving a less stereotyped 
view of the context itself, more linked to circumstances and to social relationships. For 
example, they did not ask simply “Is Marco usually on time?”, they asked also “Did A 
and Marco bet on Marco’’s punctuality?” or “Did they have an appointment on that 
day? And why?”. 
There is another striking difference. Individuals with a low score often showed they had 
no need to gather information in order to confirm their hypotheses: the interviewer had 
to encourage them to ask questions. Such indolence, if it is not due to other reasons (e.g. 
lack of understanding of  the task, shyness, etc.) indicates that the individual used an 
inferential deduction. Unlike abduction, deduction does not need empirical proof. For 
example, the individual perhaps has concluded that “Coffee does not make one sleep” 
means “I don’t want any coffee” since if you say that “Coffee does not make one sleep”  
almost certainly you don’t want any coffee/ B said “Coffee does not make one sleep” / 
almost certainly B doesn’t want any coffee. Given certain conditions, there can only be 
one conclusion and there is no need to look for empirical proof. The interviewer can 
easily find out if indolence is due to deduction, by asking for example “How can you be 
so sure of your supposition?”.   Individuals with low scores in the SMS often used 
deduction, while individuals with high scores always used abduction. 
It is interesting to observe that in order to use deduction in cases similar to the above 
mentioned one, you have to force your knowledge of the situation and assume a vision 
of the world in which necessity predominates on contingency. The introductory terms in   16
the reasoning have been inverted. If we follow a correct description of the experience, 
the preliminary condition shall be: if you don’t want any coffee you often say “Coffee 
does not make one sleep”. Given this condition inference would be abductive, rather 
than deductive, and the individual would need information to confirm the hypothesis. 
4.2 Self-monitoring and implicit theory of self 
The answers to the partner’s dilemma are mainly conditioned by two factors: the belief 
that self may be modified, i.e. self is fluid and malleable, and the belief that it is 
possible to know self, i.e how deep you can know the self of another person without 
having a deep relation with that person. Those who are inclined to believe that it is 
better to evaluate in advance usually believe that it is difficult to change self, that you 
may have a sufficient knowledge of it without having a deep relation. Those who are 
inclined to believe that it is better to create a harmonious relation may have various 
reasons: they may believe that self is malleable during a relationship or that self is little 
malleable, but all you have to do is venturing into a relation, since self cannot be known 
in advance. 
Both in the low self-monitoring group and in the high self-monitoring one there were 
individuals inclined to choose “it is better to evaluate in advance” and others who 
preferred “it is better  to create a harmonious relation”. In both groups there were 
people who saw self as rigid and knowable, others who considered it fluid and 
malleable and some others who believed it rigid and unknowable. 
However, those who believed in rigid self did not share the same opinions. Indeed, 
among them there were differences due to their levels of self-monitoring. LSM 
individuals tended to see self as a whole, while HSM individuals as a nucleus clad with 
an exterior shell. The former believed that rigid self means “you cannot change an 
individual’s personality”, the latter “there is a core you cannot change”. There were also 
differences among those who believed that self is rigid and impossible to be known. In 
order to explain the fact that you cannot know self, LSM individuals were inclined to 
say that you need a lot of time in order to know a person, while HSM individuals said 
that it is difficult to go deeper than the exterior shell of appearances. During the 
interview a HSM individual gave a clear explanation of social blindness caused by 
appearances.   17
You will never know if a person is truly what he/she appears to be or not. Therefore, it 
is better to get far from appearances and try to create a relationship, since this is the 
way to understand – at least partly, since you will never know how a person truly is – if 
a person is really reliable, if you can trust him/her… No matter how good is your 
evaluation, you will never know how a person truly is. 
As regards Anna’s dilemma, everybody – regardless of their self-monitoring levels - 
answered that it is better a trial period in the new task.  As resulted from the discussion 
and the answers to the direct questions on the subject (Describe a characteristic of 
yours/How can you say that you are so? How can you best know yourself,  by retiring to 
private life or staying with other people?), the individuals under examination were all 
convinced that social life is far more important in order to know yourself than the 
private self-examination. Regardless of their self-monitoring levels, some of them 
stressed the importance of examining one’s own social behaviour, others of social 
confrontation while some other individuals attached more importance to the impression 
your interlocutor seems to have about you. As expected (Lippa, 1976; Ickes & Barnes, 
1977; Garland & Beard, 1978), to the same question “Describe a characteristic of 
yours” HSM individuals frequently said they were likeable, while the most frequent 
answer of LSM individuals was “shyness”. 
Anna’s dilemma, however, highlighted one difference, though very little, in the way 
they intended knowledge acquisition of self. LSM individuals seemed inclined to 
believe that knowledge of self means that you better understand your self, while HSM 
individuals believe that it means to know something new on yourself, i.e. to understand 
an aspect of the self which is still unknown. It seems that the former believe that self 
may consolidate, whereas the latter think that it may grow. Such difference is 
highlighted by motivations given in order to justify the fact that they chose “the trial 
period”. Here follow two examples: 
Individual with score 17 
A certain situation may help you discover abilities you were not aware of. 
Individual with score 2 
She should try, so she could see that she can mange it   18
Luca’s dilemma concerns the problem whether self is unique or multiple. In this case no 
differences which are worth mentioning where found comparing LSM and HSM 
individuals. Indeed, in both groups it is possible to find individuals believing that 
Luca’s selves (the careful and the shabby one) are both true and individuals believing, 
on the contrary, that the shabby self is the true one, the first one being only appearance. 
Someone thinks that it is possible to multiply self, in order to have various selves to be 
used in various situations of social life. On the other hand, there is also some other 
people who believe the only thing you can do in order to adapt to situations is to 
produce selves of appearance, which can be put before the true self, which remains 
always unique.   19
4.3 The moral of self 
Antonio’s dilemma allows an exploration of the moral aspect of the implicit theories of 
self, encouraging individuals to say what they think about moral questions linked to self 
(what is the good self? How should self be in order to be good and right? What should 
behaviour be like in order to have a good self?). Here we found the most striking 
differences between LSM and HSM. 
Individuals with a low score thought that Antonio should have replied, even though this 
meant he had to renounce to sell the product. Someone believed that within certain 
limits Antonio could try to get round the subject. Some individuals pointed out that in 
case he did not sell the product, it would have been the client’s responsibility: “If the 
client uses his/her mind in doing business, he/she should exclude personal opinions”. 
On the contrary, individuals with high scores  tended to say that Antonio should either 
get round the subject or agree with the client, keeping in mind his objective (the sale of 
the product). Their opinions appeared more articulated. Generally they were more 
careful in specifying details of the situation (is he/she only a client or also a friend? Is 
he/she an occasional client that Antonio will probably never see again or not?) and in 
case they found particular reasons (the client is a friend of Antonio’s) they used to plan 
optimisation strategies (first the sale and then the discussion as friends or Antonio 
should find a compromise or use his eloquence in order to make the client think about 
what he/she is saying without risking too much). 
It seems that LSM individuals have a moral of principles and tend to be coherent, while 
HSM individuals have a moral of consequences and are not worried with coherence. 
But this is not true. Interviews showed that HSM individuals had moral principles and 
cared for coherence: some of them even showed a sort of moral rigor and a strong belief 
in interior purity. However, if both groups give importance to principles and coherence, 
how can we explain the differences of their moral choices in dilemmas such as 
Antonio’s dilemma? 
It depends on how they understand the relation means-ends. Individuals with low scores 
were convinced that in order to be coherent you have to be true to what you are, 
avoiding being influenced by situations and producing an exterior self which differs 
from the interior one in order to take advantage of it. Their idea of coherence may be   20
summed up as follows: “I do not allow the world to change me” and “I am transparent”. 
Conversely, individuals with high scores thought they could be coherent without having 
to resist to outside pressures and caring for transparency. How did they do that? 
They adopted two solutions. Some of them – we called them unscrupulous –  adopted 
different selves in various social life situations with a “director” which was not well 
characterized. As regards Luca’s dilemma they thought that self is multiple and as far as 
the partner’s dilemma was concerned they thought self is fluid. One of the interviewed 
individuals clearly explained how “unscrupulous” people maintain their coherence. 
At work you have to try to leave out personal opinions and just think how to reach your 
objective […]. There is what you are at work, what you are at home for your family, for 
your friends and then…. for other people and you are always behind, I mean, as a 
director. 
There is coherence, since each self has got its own logic and the director in the 
background knows them all and directs them. 
The second group, made up of those we called inflexible, thought that self was unique 
and rigid. Their strategy was to distinguish a deep coherent nucleus  and an external 
fluctuating halo, made up of ghosts of self to be produced in different situations. One of 
the interviewed persons clearly explained this theory: 
I believe that you always have the same deep self  and a superficial self, that is an 
intimate part, which is yours: you can choose to whom you want to show it, if you want 
to do that, when and how you want to show it. Then there is another part you manage 
according to situations, to what you have to do, to possibilities and contingencies. 
Here follows a schema of the structure of self as explained by unscrupulous and 
inflexible individuals (Fig.3). 
 
5. Conclusions and discussion 
This research study aims at being just a preliminary exploration. It does not produce 
definitive answers to the research questions. Indeed, there is the need for more 
confirmations and deeper investigations. Moreover, it does not confirm the initial 
hypotheses. However, many elements of a certain significance have been found.   21
The implicit theories of self of LSM and HSM individuals mainly differ  as far as the 
moral side is concerned. All other differences which were highlighted by this research 
are nuances or they do not appear to be of particular importance in order to understand 
individual differences of self-monitoring. Some of them, e.g. the different way of 
imagining the structure of self of the two moral types of HSM individuals, appear linked 
to the moral of self. In the light of the results we obtained the hypothesis of implicit 
theories of self should be changed: indeed, it is not the implicit theories of self on the 
whole that urge either for self-expression or self-presentation, but an aspect of them 
which is made up of the moral of self. 
However, even reformulating the hypothesis, we found no confirmations. The 
differences we found in the moral of self were not the cause of self-monitoring 
behaviour, but seem to be rationalisations, self-justifications of such behaviour. There 
may also be a circular interaction: behaviour – moral –  behaviour. Indeed, it is 
reasonable to suppose also a parallel development of self-monitoring behaviour and of 
the moral of self in its development. 
This research study also highlighted that LSM and HSM individuals both have to face 
the problem of coherence and that they simply adopt different strategies to be coherent. 
Moreover, HSM individuals may adopt two different strategies, involving a different 
idea of the structure of self. The fact that the different morals of self we found may 
represent different strategic answers to the same problem (the problem of coherence), 
which has particular significance in the social life of each individual, strengthens the 
idea that morals of self are something more than simple rationalizations of behaviours.  
Each person, even as a child, has to face the problem of conciliating coherence and 
social pressures and has to find a solution; this  imply choosing how to do that and 
develop a moral thought on this subject. It is difficult to know what comes first: doing 
or thinking?. 
This research study has confirmed the initial hypothesis regarding the reading of 
implicit meanings: HSM individuals are better at doing it than LSM individuals and 
they tend to adopt inferences based mainly on foreground information. One could reply 
that HSM individuals usually perform better thanks to social facilitations: since they are 
inclined to self-presentation, they free their imagination and obtain best results in the   22
performance. The social facilitation context, however, mirrors natural situations where 
it is useful to read implicit contents.  We do not want to show that HSM individuals 
have higher cognitive capacities in reading implicit meanings, but that their 
performances in the actual social life are better. The reason why they perform better is 
another question. The fact that HSM individuals perform better even in the written test 
suggests a higher ability regardless of social facilitations. Elements confirming this 
supposition can be found also in their behaviours during the interview. In particular 
strategies adopted by HSM individuals appeared effective as far as the reading of 
implicit meanings is concerned (drawing up scenarios, making up stories and evaluating 
themselves on the way). 
However, it does not suffice to say that HSM individuals are better at reading implicit 
meanings in order to confirm the more general hypothesis of contingent perception of 
situations. During the tests concerning the reading of implicit contents before 
researchers many suggestive clues were found, such as the tendency to draw up 
scenarios and make up stories and scenes in their own minds, to gather information 
regarding the context linked to circumstances and to the interpersonal relations; 
moreover, it was also pointed out that HSM individuals, unlike LSM ones, did not adopt 
deductive inferences. It appears interesting that in theory there is a certain congruence 
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